In perfect unison, these two volumes demonstrate how contemporary Japanese people, communities, and the state attempt to counterbalance the nation's demographic disproportions. Demographic Change vividly reveals current demographic changes in Japan, namely, the increase in the aging population (kōreika), the low birth rate (shōshika mondai), and rural depopulation (kasoka) . This work harmonizes demographic and anthropological studies while illuminating how people deal with these issues in their everyday lives. Family and Social Policy, by combining both political and historical dimensions, focuses on the state's response to demographic and family change and holistically unravels the problems underlying the implementation of Japanese social policies.
Occurring along with the demographic shift is a transformation in the reciprocal relations once valued as obligatory and part of filial piety by the Japanese. New forms of exchange and interconnection are taking place because parents' expectations of their children as well as children's own willingness to provide care for parents and in-laws are changing. Chapters in 30:1 (2004) Demographic Change reveal how discrepancies in the perception of what should be carried out by different actors are reflected in changing ideas of residential arrangements and the provision of care for elderly parents and the deceased.
Due to the change in family relationships, one of the immediate concerns of contemporary Japanese is the appropriate residential pattern. James Raymo and Toshiko Kaneda offer statistical data in Demographic Change to show that the proportion of the elderly population coresiding with children fell; there has also been a corresponding increase in the proportion of older Japanese living alone (p. 28). In response to this phenomenon in the 1980s, the prefabricated housing industry began to market two-generation houses in what was considered an ideal solution to these changes in living arrangements. Naomi Brown describes how many two-generation house owners ended up disappointed. Parents, especially mothers-in-law, anticipated much more enjoyable interaction with the younger generation instead of the free baby-sitting they were expected to supply. They found that their original ideal of a two-generation household did not match reality (p. 64).
John W. Traphagan's research demonstrates that women contest the idea of coresidence with and care provision for nonconsanguineal relatives (p. 204). Young women facing coresidential decisions view the wishes of their husbands' parents to coreside and to be taken care of as a one-sided exchange. These young women contest what the older generation considers to be a fair transaction. Underlying their resistance to coresidence are conflicting expectations about what are considered to be balanced or imbalanced exchanges among generations.
A further illustration of shifting reciprocal relationships can be seen in the change from the obligatory provision of filial care to the acceptance of community-service-based care. "Regardless of location throughout Japan approximately 90 percent of those providing in-home care to the elderly are women" (Traphagan, p. 210) . From this fact, one would assume that a majority of brides (yome), daughters-in-law, and daughters would be the first to welcome the outside support system. However, as Brenda Robb Jenike shows, obstacles faced by daughters-in-law seeking public-sector help include their own misgivings, objections from family, and the prohibitive bureaucratic process (p. 185). Despite these difficulties, the positive experiences gained by Jenike's respondents show that the shift to community care is a growing trend while the total care for aged parents as an obligation of the daughter-in-law is waning.
As presented by Yohko Tsuji in Family and Social Policy and Satsuki Kawano in Demographic Change, the traditional reciprocal relationship toward the living and the dead is also in transition. A recent change in burial practices is the development of a new grave system for those who have no descendants to take care of their graves. Eitai kuyōbo, a grave eternally cared for, has recently appeared as an option for individuals without successors (Tsuji, p. 188; Kawano, p. 136) . Such a new burial practice shows that care of the dead, once an obligation held strictly within the family, is shifting toward nonfamily and nonconsanguine members due to evolving family relationships.
In their introduction to Demographic Change, Traphagan and Knight warn us, however, that these shifts in caring for the elderly and the dead do not simply imply a depreciation in the value of the stem family (p. 146). In contrast to the impact of urbanization in developed Western nations, as of 1996, 45.4 per cent of Japanese elders coresided with their children, according to Naomi Brown (p. 56). This statistic indicates that the stem family continues to be an important concept for Japanese self-identity. Japanese modernization is not one of "convergence" as found in other urban-industrial societies (Traphagan and Knight, p. 7); rather, as Susan O. Long and C. Scott Littleton state, "continuities underlie new forms and images, whereas new practices may form from the basis of what are defined as traditions" (p. 232). These traditional values are reflected in the way Japanese people and communities try to cope, rearrange, and reconstruct the ideal of the stem family.
To what extent then is the stem family significant to the Japanese? This is exactly the question Leng Leng Thang addresses in two chapters in these two books. The ideal of stem family is so desirable that the commercialization of a "rent-a-family" service launched by one company in 1990 has a waiting list of elderly couples and individuals seeking visits from their purchased "family members" (Thang, in Family and Social Policy, p. 156) . In addition, age-integrated facilities and intergenerational programs and activities have been established since the 1990s. These intergenerational activities emphasize the stem family and the traditional, cultural, and historical knowledge of elders (Thang, in Family and Social Policy, p.172) . Thus, these programs and facilities not only simulate stem families but also attempt to cultivate the notion of filial piety in the new generation of youngsters.
The village of Hongū, where John Knight conducted his research, also sought to recreate traditional multigenerational households using various promotions, one of which was to set up rural-based mail-order food enterprises (furusatokai). Packages sent from local producers simulated packages sent from one's home country in the days before rural depopulation, which began in the 1960s (Knight, in Demographic Change, p. 121) . By building links between city-dwelling furusatokai members and rural food producers, this system created fictional ties between families living in cities and rural areas. These examples of building substitute stem families and fictional ties demonstrate that the stem family is not just nostalgia but an intrinsic value very much alive among the Japanese today.
Rural depopulation, low birth rates, and the increase of the elderly pop-ulation are also major concerns of the state. Some social policies, such as the increase in daycare facilities, nurseries, and nursing homes, had have positive outcomes. However, as chapters in Family and Social Policy clearly demonstrate, they have not been entirely successful. The reason behind the ineffectiveness of Japanese welfare policies lies in the limited vision of the state in identifying problems, targets of concern, and designated responsibilities. The state's position on welfare policies is a reflection of the development trajectory of civil society after the postwar period. As Victoria Lyon Bestor examines (in Family and Social Policy) through the "biography of civil society," both corporate and state-led welfare programs were loyal to mainstream government projects and policies. This loyalty implied that welfare policies were subjected to a government-centered vision of social welfare. Family and Social Policy shows how the exclusive definition of citizenship and the standardization of normality by the Japanese government have ultimately hindered the implementation of welfare policies. Who, then, are those Japanese citizens entitled to receive welfare and other state support systems? The model citizen category includes whitecollar, heterosexual, able-bodied, and fertile Japanese males (Mackie, in Family and Social Policy, p. 219). The farther a person strays from these features, the more that person is considered marginalized. For example, a female immigrant manual worker is discriminated against because of her lack of a Japanese bloodline and because of her manual-labor characteristics, while immigrant brides who might share similar features are less stigmatized because their reproductive and domestic labor service provides for the continuation of the patriarchal Japanese family system (p. 222). And yet, as the study by Setsuko Lee and Carolyn Stevens on reproduction identity shows, these immigrant brides also suffer from discrimination. Maternal death, fetal death, and infant mortality rates of foreign mothers and babies (e.g., Filipina, Thai, and Peruvian) were much higher than the Japanese rate (pp. 99 -104). Ultimately, the state's discrimination toward mixed children is in direct conflict with its childbirth policies because foreign mothers and their children in fact do provide exactly what the state has explicitly targeted.
The state's persistent position in constructing "Japaneseness" continues into child-rearing policies. As Eyal Ben-Ari reveals, children are homogenized into "normal" Japanese through the "institution-ness" of preschools (p. 111). Children's subjugation to organizational control is directly linked to the construction of order defined by the state. These studies all show the extent of power and pervasiveness in the state's interpretation of Japanese identity, social policies that embrace it, and discrepancies within state policies. In short, social policies dealing with demographic change are not as successful as they might be because of their incoherent and limited vision of changing Japanese families, individuals, and their identities. Consequently, welfare policies in Japan are in the process of being contested from various directions.
In order to respond to the problem of its declining population, Tōwachō, a municipality in Tohoku, implemented what Christopher Thompson calls "population policies" (Demographic Change, p. 90), in which self-initiated development projects (jisaku shuenjigyō) were initiated by the mayor. The effort failed not only because of the conflicting interests between state and local bureaucrats, but also due to disagreements among local residents. A case in point was the perception toward the policy of gentan (restriction on the amount of rice grown). The mayor's initiative to change the state's gentan policy for the sake of creating secure employment in the long run met opposition from community members as well as prefectural bureaucrats. The history of this village illuminates how the failure of repopulation policy was caused by conflicting interests with other state policy that had been powerfully ingrained among community members.
Another example of contradictions among social policies, state vision, and the reality lived by the Japanese can be observed in the Angel Plan (Enzeru Puran) launched in 1995 by the Ministry of Health and Welfare. The plan primarily sought to support child-rearing practices but also aimed to respond to the problem of homemakers who felt isolated during child rearing (Glenda Roberts, in Family and Social Policy, p. 60). The Angel Plan tried to support women by creating an environment for childcare leave that would enable them to continue to work and would provide support for reemployment opportunities (p. 65). Nevertheless, the plan was ineffective because although women were encouraged to work, there was in fact no employment structure supporting it. The division of labor in Japan remains firm. Even if men wished to participate in child rearing, it would be incompatible with the corporate structure in Japan.
Roger Goodman's research illustrates the gap between social policies as well as the interactive process in which social policies and social awareness are formed. He reveals that the very concept of child abuse in Japan was a "discovery" in the 1990s. In the 1980s, child abuse was considered rare. This changed dramatically once the Japanese government offered a legal definition of child abuse in 1990. Since then, child abuse has been disclosed increasingly (pp. 149 -50) .
These examples from both books demonstrate that no single dimension of social change is isolated from the influence of other social policies and the awareness of people. The history of Japanese death policies also illuminates this point. The state outlawed cremation in 1873, only to lift the ban two years later due to popular protest (Yohko Tsuji, p. 178) . Shizensō, the scattering of bones, underwent government scrutiny but, with the support of mass media and the general public, the state announced it as legal (p. 189).
Ultimately, in order to respond to demographic change, Japan has to generate not only coherence within state policies but also implicitly understand the changing interests of families and individuals.
In conclusion, the two books are rife with case studies on the effects of demographic changes on the lives of the Japanese people and the social policies that attempt to resolve them through historical, statistical, and micro/macro analysis. They provide excellent insight into the mechanism of civil society and how demographic and familial changes in Japan are greatly influenced by the changing values of the Japanese people as well as the state's vision regarding different social issues and policies. I highly recommend these books, not only for scholars and students interested in the relationships between demographic change and the development of social policies in contemporary Japan, but also for social policymakers who, if they truly wish to globalize Japan (kokusaika), should understand the absolute necessity of a holistic approach to the implementation of social policies. Reviewed by Robin M. LeBlanc Washington and Lee University
Consumer Politics in Postwar Japan
In Consumer Politics in Postwar Japan, Patricia Maclachlan traces the development of consumer advocacy through the decades since the end of World War II. Through a lucid history and detailed case studies, she discusses the extent to which the growing consumer movement was able to have an influence on the evolution of consumer protection policy from the regulation of unfair and unsafe trade practices in the immediate postwar era to the passage of a product liability law in the mid-1990s. She pays especially careful attention to the complicated ways in which the institutional features of Japanese politics shaped the landscape on which consumer advocates waged their battles, and she handily sets the entire story within a comparative framework, explaining how Japanese consumer politics have compared to (and sometimes been influenced by) those in the United States and Britain. Maclachlan finds that consumer advocates do play a significant role in keeping consumer protection on the policy agenda, but they win their specific policy preferences only in bits and only occasionally. Institutional factors such as jurisdictional competition within a powerful bureaucracy and the long, single-party dominance of the business-oriented Liberal Dem-
